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IoT technology has been widely valued and applied, and the resulting massive IoTdata brings many challenges to the traditional
centralized data management, such as performance, privacy, and security challenges. (is paper proposes an IoT data access
control scheme that combines attribute-based encryption (ABE) and blockchain technology. Symmetric encryption and ABE
algorithms are utilized to realize fine-grained access control and ensure the security and openness of IoT data. Moreover,
blockchain technology is combined with distributed storage to solve the storage bottleneck of blockchain systems. Only the hash
values of the data, the hash values of the ciphertext location, the access control policy, and other important information are stored
on the blockchain. In this scheme, smart contract is used to implement access control.(e results of experiments demonstrate that
the proposed scheme can effectively protect the security and privacy of IoT data and realize the secure sharing of data.
1. Introduction
At present, the Internet of (ings (IoT) technology has been
more and more widely used [1], such as in smart medicine
and smart cars. IoT devices generate data in real-time and
share data by connecting to the Internet. In most traditional
IoTsystems, data storage and computing adopt a centralized
architecture, but the massive, heterogeneous data charac-
teristics and multidimensional, real-time service requests
pose great challenges to the centralized data management
architecture [2]. Centralized storage and computing archi-
tectures are vulnerable to various network attacks, such as
data tampering attack, single-point attacks, and distributed
denial-of-service attacks [3]. IoTdata is a true description of
the physical world and often involves personal privacy. If
these data are maliciously tampered, forged, or illegally
accessed, it may cause disastrous consequences.
A blockchain is a decentralized, tamper-proof, traceable,
and multiparty distributed database that integrates a P2P
protocol, asymmetric encryption technology, a consensus
mechanism, and other technologies [4]. (e data on a
blockchain are transparent to each participant, and as long
as an honest node holds most of the CPU computing power,
the system is safe and reliable. (erefore, the security
mechanism of blockchain can effectively solve the problem
of data authenticity in the application of IoT, and to a certain
extent, it can guarantee the confidentiality and availability of
industrial IoT data [5]. Smart contracts—self-executing
scripts that reside on the blockchain—allow for distributed,
heavily automated workflows.(is should make blockchains
very suitable for combination with IoT applications [6]. Ge
et al. [7] combined blockchain technology with IoT and
proposed a decentralized security mechanism based on
blockchain technology; the key data generated by IoTdevices
are stored in the blockchain, and the privacy and security
problems that may be encountered by the centralized IoTare
solved. Li et al. [8] applied blockchain technology to the
medical field and proposed a data protection system (DPS)
architecture that stores important medical records on the
blockchain to achieve the purposes of data being tamper-
proof and traceable.
On the contrary, a centralized storage architecture re-
sults in data producers having no control over the data. For
instance, large websites collect not only personal
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information, such as users’ hobbies and browsing habits, but
also personal privacy data, which introduces potential
threats to personal privacy security.(erefore, it is necessary
to strengthen the data owner’s control over the data and
decide whether other users have the right to access the data
[9, 10]. In 2005, attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first
proposed by Waters to support the integration of data
privacy protection and access control [11]. In the ABE
mechanism, the user’s private key and ciphertext are asso-
ciated with a group of attributes, and the user can suc-
cessfully decrypt the plaintext only when the number of
attribute intersections between the attribute set associated
with the user’s private key and that associated with the
ciphertext reaches the threshold value set by the system.
However, there remain many defects and vulnerabilities
in blockchain technology, among which storage is one of the
most notable [12]. For instance, the Bitcoin system produced
a total of 546,349 blocks by October 18, 2018, and the size of
a block is generally 996.2 kB, and the size of the entire
blockchain is 186.9GB [13]. With the passage of time, the
storage space required by blockchain systems will become
increasingly larger. If all the data generated by IoT devices
are stored on the blockchain, the size of the entire blockchain
will be very large. However, IoT devices cannot store such a
large blockchain, so storage optimization is an important
challenge that must be overcome. (e interplanetary file
system (IPFS) is a point-to-point distributed file system [14]
that aims to connect all computing devices with the same file
system and can be used as a storage scheme for blockchains.
Xu et al. [15] proposed a decentralized social network system
based on Ethereum and IPFS, which uses IPFS to save large
amounts of file data to reduce the Ethereum storage pres-
sure. Klems et al. [16] proposed a decentralized service
market system based on blockchain technology and IPFS. In
this system, large amounts of data and service metadata are
stored in the IPFS network, while only the hash values of
these data are stored in the blockchain.
(is paper proposes an IoT data access control scheme
that combines an ABE algorithm and blockchain technol-
ogy. In view of the privacy and security problems of IoTdata,
a symmetric encryption algorithm is combined with an ABE
algorithm. Only users whomeet the access control policy can
successfully access the data and achieve fine-grained access
control. To solve the problem of the low storage capacity of
blockchain network nodes, the “off-chain” storage mode is
adopted. (e data are encrypted by a symmetric encryption
algorithm, and the ciphertext of the data is stored in the IPFS
network. (e address hash value of encrypted data stored on
IPFS is saved on the blockchain. In this way, the blockchain
network is associated with IPFS, which reduces the burden
of blockchain storage. Moreover, a consortium blockchain
system was constructed based on the Hyperledger Fabric
framework, and experiments were carried out to prove the
feasibility of the scheme.
At present, there have been many access control schemes
based on ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-
ABE) [17] and blockchain, but these schemes often focus on
the granularity of access control, but pay less attention to the
efficiency of data sharing. Some researchers realize that
blockchain cannot store a large amount of data and adopt
cloud storage, but the efficiency of cloud storage is low. (e
access control scheme proposed in this paper not only uses
CP-ABE and blockchain to realize access control but also
ensures the simplicity of the control process. (erefore, the
scheme realizes the balance between fine-grained access
control and efficient file sharing.
(e main contributions of our work are as follows:
(1) (e scheme proposed in this paper can ensure the
secure and efficient sharing of IoTdata, provide fine-
grained access to data, simple control process, and
enhance the scalability of blockchain system storage.
(e scheme realizes the balance between fine-
grained access control and efficient file sharing.
(2) (e blockchain is used to store the address hash
value of a file on IPFS, data hash value, access control
policy, timestamp, and other information (is
scheme not only ensures that the data cannot be
tampered with but also ensures that the access
control strategy cannot be tampered with.
2. Related Work
(ere have been many studies on the application of
blockchain technology to data sharing and access control of
IoT. For example, Ge et al. and Li et al. [8] used blockchain
technology to store important data generated by IoTdevices,
solve the privacy and security problems of centralized
storage architectures, and realize the secure sharing of data.
However, these strategies are weak in terms of data access
control and do not optimize the blockchain storage; thus,
they easily encounter the blockchain storage bottleneck.
2.1. Access Control and Blockchain. Access control tech-
nology is widely used in all types of information systems to
control the access rights of users and avoid illegal access to
data. However, the traditional access control scheme mainly
relies on a third-party trusted server, which is characterized
by problems such as a single point of failure and low
efficiency.
Many researchers have proposed attribute-based data
access control methods [9, 10]. In order to ensure the
confidentiality of data, an application level fine-grained data
access is designed by using the attribute-based encryption
method [9]. Fan et al. proposed a fine-grained access-control
scheme based on CP-ABE and Trusted Execution Envi-
ronment (TEE) [10]. TEE is employed as a trusted com-
puting environment to protect encrypted data [9, 10]. (is
paper uses blockchain technology to ensure the integrity of
encrypted data. In the work by Jemel and Serhrouchni [18], a
dynamic access control strategy based on blockchain tech-
nology and ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) was proposed. (e time attribute is introduced to
realize the dynamic access of data, and only a user whose
attribute meets the access control policy within the specified
time can access the data.
Blockchain technology is a new technology that can
effectively solve the problems existing in traditional access
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control. Many researchers have explored the combination of
a blockchain and IoT access control technology. For in-
stance, Novo [19] proposed an extensible access manage-
ment architecture for IoT based on blockchain technology,
which defines and executes access control rules via smart
contracts. However, this scheme is based on a private
blockchain network and sacrifices decentralization to im-
prove performance.
Li et al. [20] proposed an authentication and security
scheme for IoT based on blockchain technology, in which
the hash values of important data are stored in the block-
chain and the unique ID of the device is recorded for au-
thentication, which can effectively avoid single-point-of-
failure attacks on the certificate authority (CA) server.
However, this scheme ignores the storage bottleneck of
blockchains. Ding et al. [21] proposed an attribute-based
access control framework, which uses a set of attributes to
describe devices and records the distribution of attributes on
the chain to avoid a single point of failure and data tam-
pering. Moreover, this scheme uses signature technology
and hash operations to simplify the access control protocol.
To a certain extent, while the methods proposed in these
studies can achieve data access control, even fine-grained
access control, there remain blockchain storage bottlenecks.
2.2. Blockchain and Storage Optimization. Compared with
the traditional centralized storage architecture, blockchain
technology is characterized by decentralization and non-
tamperability, which can effectively guarantee the security of
data and improve the scalability of the system. However, the
application of blockchain technology to a storage system also
introduces new challenges, such as the increase of the storage
space overhead.
To solve the blockchain storage problem, many inves-
tigations have been carried out. In the work by Zhang and
Wang [12], a blockchain fragmentation storage model based
on threshold secret sharing was proposed. By improving the
Shamir threshold, instead of storing complete transaction
data in each node, the data on the chain are segmented and
stored, which can effectively reduce the storage capacity of
each node. Dai et al. [22] proposed a blockchain storage
architecture called NC-DS, which uses network coding to
encode data and save the storage space of the blockchain.
In these previous studies, data were dealt with directly.
(e method proposed by Zhang and Wang [12] stores the
data in pieces, while the method proposed by Dai et al. [22]
encodes the data. Both schemes can reduce the storage cost
of blockchains, but they are both improved on the basis of
storing a complete ledger, which saves little space and
weakens access control. Cheng et al. [23] proposed a data
management scheme for IoT based on blockchain tech-
nology and edge computing, which uses the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm to protect
data security and personal privacy, stores the hash values
and some important files on the chain, and stores the
encrypted data on the edge server by using a distributed
algorithm (Kademlia) to solve the storage bottleneck
problem of the blockchain system.
Some data sharing schemes combine the CP-ABE al-
gorithm with blockchain and cloud storage. Wang and Song
[24] used attribute-based encryption (ABE) and identity-
based encryption (IBE) to encrypt medical data and used
identity-based signature (IBS) to implement digital signa-
tures.Wang et al. proposed a personal health records sharing
scheme based on blockchain [25]. Wang’s scheme used
searchable symmetric encryption and attribute-based en-
cryption techniques to achieve fine-grained access control.
Wang’s scheme allowed patients to distribute attribute
private key for users. Both [24, 25] uses the cloud to store
medical data, but the security of data privacy depends on
cloud service providers.
However, in each data access process, data consumers
must communicate with data owners to obtain access rights,
which takes a considerable amount of time. In the scheme
proposed in this paper, the encrypted data are stored in an
IPFS distributed network, and the CP-ABE algorithm is used
to achieve fine-grained data access control. (e blockchain
only stores the hash values of data, the content hash values
generated by IPFS, the access control policy, timestamps,
and other metadata information, which greatly reduces the
storage overhead.
3. Data Access Control Scheme
3.1. Scheme Architecture. (e architecture of the data access
control scheme that combines ABE and blockchain tech-
nology consists of five layers, namely, the consumption layer,
interaction layer, access control layer, data layer, and IoT
devices layer, as shown in Figure 1. (e consumption layer
contains all kinds of data consumers, software, or hardware.
(e interaction layer provides good access protocols and
services for data consumers. (e access control layer is the
concrete realization of business logic, including the reali-
zation of smart contracts and the data control access al-
gorithm. Finally, the data layer consists of the blockchain
network and IPFS distributed network. (e bottom layer is
IoT devices layer. IoT devices generate all kinds of data.
(e blockchain network is used to store the hash values
of data, the content hash values generated by IPFS, the access
control policy, timestamps, and other information. Data
consumers must meet the stipulations of the access control
policy on the blockchain to access the data. After successful
access, the consistency and integrity of the data can also be
verified through the blockchain. (e IPFS distributed net-
work is composed of several server devices with good
performance. (e data generated by IoT devices will be
encrypted and stored in IPFS, and the hash content values
generated by IPFS will be stored on the blockchain. In this
way, the blockchain network is associated with IPFS, thereby
reducing the burden of blockchain storage. (e third-party
authorization server mainly generates and transmits the
public key (PK) and master key (MK) generated by the CP-
ABE initialization algorithm and the private key (SK)
generated by the CP-ABE key generation algorithm. In this
architecture, users do not need to join the blockchain
network, let alone consider the specific implementation
details of the whole access control scheme. IoT devices only
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produce data or files, and data consumers only need to access
data or files. In this scheme, the owner of the IoT device is
called the data owner.
3.2. Blockchain Design. A blockchain is composed of many
blocks, each of which contains a block header and block
body. (e structure of a blockchain is presented in Figure 2.
(e block header stores the version number (VersionId), the
hash value of the previous block (PreBlock Hash), the
Merkel root, and the timestamp (TimeStamp). PreBlock
Hash links isolated blocks into chains, TimeStamp refers to
the generation time of the block, and the Merkle root is the
hash of multiple transaction data. (e tampering of trans-
action data will lead to the inconsistency of the Merkle root,
which can be used for transaction integrity verification. (e
block body primarily stores the hash values of the source
data (hashfile), the hash values generated by IPFS (hashipfs),
and the access control strategy (policy). Among them,
hashfile is generated by the SHA256 algorithm and occupies
32 bytes, hashipfs is the hash value returned after uploading
the file to the IPFS network and also occupies 32 bytes, and
policy is the access control strategy of the data owner;
different owners have different policies, and the upper limit
is 1000 bytes.
3.3. Attribute-Based Encryption Mechanism. In the ABE
mechanism, the sender uses a set of attributes W to encrypt
the message, and the receiver uses a set of attributes W′ to
describe the identity corresponding to the private key. Only
when the intersection number of W′ and W exceeds the
threshold value t set by the system can the message receiver
decrypt the ciphertext. However, this mechanism is limited
by access control structures that can only support the
threshold policy.
To solve this problem, Goyal et al. [26] proposed a key
policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme, which
supports fine-grained data access control. In this scheme, the
ciphertext is associated with the attribute set of the system,
and the key is associated with the access control structure.
Only when the attribute set of the user satisfies the access
control policy can the decryption be performed. Additionally,
Bethencourt et al. proposed CP-ABE [17], which is different
from KP-ABE. (e ciphertext of CP-ABE is associated with
access control, and its key is associated with the attribute set.
Only when the user’s attribute set satisfies this access control
structure can it be decrypted. Moreover, the access control
authority of CP-ABE is controlled by the message sender.
(erefore, the CP-ABE encryption scheme was adopted in the
present work to ensure the data owner’s control over the data






















Figure 1: Architectural diagram of the scheme.
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algorithm flow of CP-ABE is presented in Figure 3 and is
composed of four polynomial algorithms.
(1) (e initialization phase: the trusted key distribution
center executes the random initialization algorithm,
as shown in equation (1); the input is the security
parameter r, and the output includes the public key
(PK) and master key (MK):
(PK, MK) � Setup(r). (1)
(2) (e key generation stage: the trusted key distribution
center executes the key generation algorithm, as shown
in equation (2); the inputs are PK and MK generated
by equation (1) and the user-defined attribute set A,
and the output includes a private key (SK):
SK � KeyGen(PK,MK, A). (2)
(3) (e data encryption stage: the data owner executes
the encryption algorithm, as shown in equation (3);
the inputs include PK, the message m to be
encrypted, and the access structure T, and the output
is the ciphertext c:
c � Encrypt(PK, m, T). (3)
(4) (e data decryption stage: the data requester exe-
cutes the decryption algorithm, as shown in equation
(4); the inputs include PK, SK, and c, and the output
is the plaintext message m:
m � Decrypt(PK, c, SK). (4)
Table 1 presents the description of the symbols used in
this scheme.
3.4. IPFSDistributed Storage. IPFS combines the distributed
hash table (DHT), incentive block exchange, self-authenti-
cation namespace, and other technologies. Moreover, the
data of IPFS are distributed on different devices, and there
exist multiple backups to avoid a single point of failure.
Different from the existing web system, in which resources
are accessed through URLs, IPFS allows for the retrieval of
files by obtaining a unique hash value from the file content.
(erefore, once the content of the file changes, the address of
the file will change, thereby achieving tamper-proof data.
With the passage of time, the storage space required by the
blockchain will become increasingly larger. In the proposed
method, the ciphertext of the file is stored in the IPFS
network, which can alleviate the rapid expansion of the
blockchain caused by too much data.
3.5. Data Storage and Access
3.5.1. Data Storage. As shown in Figure 4, the data storage
procedure of this scheme includes five participants, namely,
the data owner, system server side, IPFS distributed network,
blockchain network, and third-party authorization server.
(e detailed process is as follows.
(1) (e data owner (Owner) selects the file to be stored
and sets the access control policy of the file (policy).
(e data consumer (Consumer) can successfully
access the file only if the set of attributes of the data
consumer meets the stipulations of the access control
policy:
policy⟵(Owner, file). (5)
(2) (e data owner has a unique AES key (key). If the
data owner has not generated the key before, the
server side calls the AES key generation algorithm to
generate the key, as shown in equation (6). (en, the
server side calls the AES encryption algorithm to
encrypt the file and obtain the encrypted file
(encfile), as shown in equation (7). Finally, the server
side calls the IPFS storage algorithm to store the







































Figure 2: Blockchain structure.
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shown in equation (8), and records the hash value
(hashipfs) used to access the ciphertext:
key � AES.Gen(Owner), (6)
encfile � AES.Enc(key, file), (7)
hashipfs � IPFS.Store(encfile). (8)
(3) (e server side calls the SHA256 algorithm to hash
the file to get the file hash value (hashfile), as shown
in equation (9). (en, the previously generated
hashfile, hashipfs, and policy are sent to the block-
chain network:
hashfile � SHA256.Hash(file). (9)
(4) (e blockchain network receives the data storage
request and triggers the storage smart contract
(StoreCont) to store the hashfile, hashipfs, and
policy on the blockchain:
StoreCont(hashfile, hashipfs, policy). (10)
(5) (e server side requests the public key (PK) from the
third-party authorization server for the later en-
cryption of the file.
(6) (e data owner has a unique public key (PK) and a
unique master key (MK). If the data owner has not
generated the public key and master key before, the
third-party authorization server will call the ini-
tialization algorithm (Setup) of the CP-ABE algo-
rithm to generate and store PK and MK, as shown in
equation (11), and will then send PK to the server
side:
PK,MK � CPABE.Setup(r). (11)
(7) (e server side calls the encryption algorithm
(Encrypt) of the CP-ABE algorithm, takes the policy
and PK as the input of the encryption algorithm,
encrypts the key to get the ciphertext of the key
(enckey), and stores it, as shown in the following
equation:
enckey � CPABE.Encrypt(PK, key, policy). (12)
(e data storage algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
3.5.2. Data Access. As shown in Figure 5, the data access
process of this scheme includes five participants, namely, the
data consumer, system server side, IPFS distributed network,
blockchain network, and third-party authorization server.
(e detailed process is as follows.
(1) (e data consumer (Consumer) sends out a request
to access the file, which contains the attribute set A of
the data consumer.
(2) After receiving the request from the data consumer,
the server side requests the hash value of the file
(hashfile) and the hash value used to access the
ciphertext of the file to the IPFS network (hashipfs)
from the blockchain network.
(3) (e blockchain network receives the data access
request, triggers a query smart contract
authorized
institution
(1) Setup (r) → (PK, MK)
(2) KeyGen (PK, MK, A) → SK
(3) Encrypt (PK, m, T) → c
(4) Decrypt (PK, c, SK) → m
c












Figure 3: CP-ABE algorithm flow.





policy Access control policy set by data owner
key Key generated by AES algorithm
encfile Ciphertext of a file
hashipfs (e address of the ciphertext of the file on IPFS
hashfile (e hash value of the file
PK Public key generated by CP-ABE algorithm
MK Master key generated by CP-ABE algorithm
SK Private key generated by CP-ABE algorithm
A Attribute set of data consumers
enckey Ciphertext of key
deckey Decrypted key
decfile Decrypted file
dechash Hash value of encrypted file after decryption
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(QueryCont), gets the hashfile and hashipfs, and
sends them to the server side:
hashfile, hashipfs⟵QueryCont(file). (13)
(4) (e server side requests the public key PK and
private key SK from the third-party authorization
server to later decrypt the file.
(5) According to PK, MK, and attribute set A of the data
consumer, the third-party authorization server ex-
ecutes the key generation algorithm (KeyGen) of the
CP-ABE algorithm to generate the private key (SK),
as shown in equation (14), and sends PK and SK to
the server side:
SK � CPABE.KeyGen(PK,MK,A). (14)
data owner
third-party 
authorization serverblockchain networkIPFS networkserver side
Data stored successfully
6. Call Setup of CP-ABE
 algorithm to generate 
the PK and MK and 
store them locally
7. Using the access control policy T set 
by the data ownerand PK, call the 
encryption algorithm of CP-ABE to 
encrypt the AES secret key, get the 
enckey and store it locally.
Store success
4. Trigger storage 
smart contract
2. Generate the AES 
secret key and 
encrypt the file, get 
the encrypted file 
(encfile) and send 
the encfile to IPFS, 
record the returned 
hashipfs.
1. Store files and 
set access 
control policies
3. SHA256 hashes the file to get hashfile,
and stores hashfile, hashipfs and
access policy on the chain.
5. Request PK
Successfully return PK
Figure 4: Data storage flow.
Begin
policy⟵ (Owner, file)







if PK, MK not exist then
PK, MK�CPABE. Setup(r)
end if
enckey�CPABE. Encrypt(PK, key, policy)
End
ALGORITHM 1: Data Storage.
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(6) According to the hashipfs obtained from the chain,
the server side calls the IPFS query algorithm to
obtain the ciphertext of the file (encfile) from the
IPFS network, as shown in the following equation:
encfile � IPFS.Query(file, hashipfs). (15)
(7) (e server side obtains the AES key ciphertext
(enckey) that encrypts the file locally and calls the
decryption algorithm (Decrypt) of the CP-ABE al-
gorithm to decrypt enckey and obtain the decryption
key (deckey), as shown in the following equation:
deckey � CPABE.Decrypt(PK, enckey, SK),
enckey � Get(file).
(16)
(8) According to deckey, the server side calls the AES
decryption algorithm to decrypt encfile and obtains
the decrypted file (decfile), as shown in the following
equation:
decfile � AES.Dec(deckey, encfile). (17)
(9) (e server side calls the SHA256 algorithm to hash
decfile and gets the hash value of decfile (dechash),
as shown in equation (18). If hashfile and dechash are
the same, the access is successful:
dechash � SHA256.Hash(decfile). (18)
(e data access algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
4. Security Model
4.1. Tamper-Proof. In environmental monitoring, equip-
ment detection, and other scenarios, a large number of
IoT devices will be used. For example, a variety of sensors
are used to detect the quality of large-scale equipment.
Dishonest device manufacturers can make their unqual-
ified products pass the detection by tampering the de-
tection data, which is the threat of data tampering in the
IoT.
(e data block on the blockchain contains a timestamp
and the hash value of the previous block. (e blocks linked
in the chronological order ensure that the transaction
messages cannot be modified arbitrarily unless 51% of the
nodes in the whole network are tampered, which is almost
impossible in a large blockchain network. (erefore, this
scheme can avoid the threat of data tampering.
data consumer
third-party 
authorization serverblockchain network IPFS networkserver side
3. Trigger query
smart contract




7. Call Decrypt of CP-ABE algorithm to decrypt the
enckey to get the decryption key (deckey).
8. Call AES decryption algorithm to decrypt the encfile, 
and obtains the decrypted file (decfile).
9. Call SHA256 algorithm to hash decfile, and gets the 
hash value of decfile (dechash). If hashfile and dechash
are the same, the access is successful.Access success
2. Request file hashfile





4. Request PK and SK
Successfully return PK and SK
6. According to hashipfs, request file ciphertext (encfile)
Successfully return encfile
Figure 5: Data access flow.
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4.2. Confidentiality and Integrity. Some IoTapplications will
store users’ private information. For example, the medical
IoT system will store patients’ condition, and the traffic
monitoring system will store vehicles’ video. Hackers will
attack this kind of IoT applications to illegally obtain the
private data, resulting in the threat of illegal access and data
leakage.
(e data access control scheme proposed in this paper
ensures the confidentiality and integrity of system data. Via
the combination of the AES symmetric encryption algorithm
and CP-ABE algorithm, the data owner formulates the
control access policy. Only when the attribute set owned by
the data visitor meets the stipulations of the policy can the
data be accessed. (e data access permission of this scheme
is determined by the data owner, and the fine-grained access
control and sharing of data are realized by setting different
access policies. During the process of data storage and ac-
cess, the data are transmitted in an encrypted state, and
visitors outside the data access authority cannot obtain the
real data, which ensures data confidentiality. Moreover, the
hash algorithm is used to hash the original data, and the hash
values are stored on the blockchain. (e data visitor cal-
culates the hash value after receiving the data and compares
it with the hash value on the chain; if the data has been
tampered with, the two hash values will be inconsistent,
which allows for the verification of the integrity of the data.
4.3. Scalability and Reliability. IoT devices usually run for a
long time, and many devices work in the field or unmanned
environment for a long time, such as water quality moni-
toring sensors. IoTdata servers are prone to various failures
due to long hours of work or are subject to DOS attacks,
resulting in data loss or system crashes. (is is called the
single-point-of-failure threat.
(e data access control scheme proposed in this paper
ensures the reliability and robustness of the system. Tra-
ditional centralized storage and computing architectures are
prone to a single point of failure. If a device is damaged, all
devices may be affected, thereby causing irreparable losses.
In this work, decentralized blockchain technology and IPFS
distributed technology were combined to store the cipher-
text of data on the P2P distributed IPFS network, which
alleviates the storage pressure of the blockchain and en-
hances the scalability of the blockchain system. In the IPFS
network, large-capacity ciphertext data will be divided into
multiple 256 kB packets and stored on different nodes with
multiple copies. As long as a node on the IPFS network has a
copy of the data content, the data visitors can access it
according to the retrieval hash value of the corresponding
data. In addition, once the content of the data changes, the
address to retrieve the data will change to achieve the
antitampering purpose.
5. Experiment and Analysis
5.1. Experimental Environment. To verify the feasibility of
the proposed data access control scheme that combines ABE
and blockchain technology, a prototype system was con-
structed for verification. (e configuration of the prototype
system environment mainly included a blockchain network
and IPFS distributed network. (is system used the
Hyperledger Fabric framework and Docker container
technology to build the blockchain network. Due to the
limited number of servers, the CentOS 7 virtual machine was
used as the running environment of Fabric. (is blockchain
network consisted of an Orderer node and four Peer nodes.
(e details are reported in Table 2. (e system used go-ipfs
to build a private IPFS distributed network, which was
composed of seven devices in the same LAN. In addition, a
local server was compared with the IPFS distributed net-
work. (e specific configuration information of the
equipment is presented in Table 3.
5.2. Operation Process of the Smart Contract. In the
Hyperledger Fabric framework, a smart contract is called a
Chaincode, which is a piece of code written in the Go
programming language. It runs in an independent and se-
cure Docker container and initializes and manages the
Begin
hashfile, hashipfs⟵ QueryCont(file)
if SK not exist then
SK�CPABE. KeyGen (PK, MK, A)
end if
encfile� IPFS. Query (file, hashipfs)
enckey�Get (Owner)
deckey�CPABE. Decrypt (PK, enckey, SK)
decfile�AES. Dec (deckey, encfile)
dechash� SHA256. Hash (decfile)
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ledger state via the transaction submitted by the application.
A smart contract works automatically. Once the smart
contract is verified, the verified result set is sent to the
Orderer nodes, and the changes in the running results will be
shared or synchronized to all Peer nodes in the Fabric
network. Hyperledger Fabric provides four basic commands
to manage the life cycle of smart contracts, namely, package,
install, instantiate, and upgrade.
In this experiment, there were two main smart contracts,
namely, storage and query smart contracts. (e storage
smart contract primarily stores the file hash result encrypted
by SHA256 (hashfile), the file hash value generated by IPFS
(hashipfs), and the access control policy on the blockchain.
(e query smart contract mainly extracts metadata, such as
hashfile and hashipfs. (e specific steps are as follows:
(1) Start the Fabric network: use the Docker-Compose
tool to read the configuration file to start the Or-
derer, Peer1, Peer2, Peer3, Peer4, CA, and Couchdb
services.
(2) Create a channel: based on the Orderer node, es-
tablish a channel named mychannel, and add four
Peer nodes to the channel.
(3) Install and initialize the smart contracts: use the
install command to install the storage and query
smart contracts for Peer nodes, and set the en-
dorsement policy. In our experiment, there are two
organizations, and a transaction is valid only when
the members of the two organizations jointly
endorse.
(4) Use smart contracts: use the fabric-sdk-java tool to
call the smart contracts to meet the needs of storage
and query.
5.3. Experimental Results
5.3.1. Access Control Structure. (e efficiency of the access
control scheme is limited by the access control structure and
file storage mode. (e access control structure in this study
consists of the process of attribute-based encryption and file
encryption. (erefore, comparative experiments were car-
ried out under different numbers of attributes. All the files in
the experiment are numerical data files, which are randomly
generated by computer software.(e numerical value has no
effect on the experimental results.(e reported experimental
results are the average results of 50 experimental runs.
(is experiment was conducted to investigate the time
taken by the access control scheme to encrypt and decrypt
files under different numbers of attributes. (e fixed file size
in this experiment was 500 kB. (e comparison method was
C-AB/IB-ES which was proposed by Hao Wang and Song
[24]. C-AB/IB-ES uses attribute-based encryption (ABE)
and identity-based encryption (IBE) to encrypt data and uses
identity-based signature (IBS) to implement digital signa-
tures. (e access control structure of C-AB/IB-ES is more
complex than our scheme. As shown in Figure 6, the ex-
perimental results reveal that, with the increase of the
number of attributes, the encryption and decryption time of
the two algorithms increased linearly, which demonstrates
that the computational overhead of these schemes were
controllable. (e encryption and decryption time of our
method is much shorter than that of [24]. (is indicates that
the more complex the access control structure of the CP-
ABE algorithm, the more time it takes for access control.
(erefore, while pursuing fine-grained data access control,
the fewer the number of attributes, the lesser the compu-
tational overhead of the system.
Table 2: Fabric network configuration.
Node name Docker image file Simulation object
orderer.example.com Hyperledger/Fabric-orderer Orderer
peer0.org1.example.com Hyperledger/Fabric-peer Peer1 node
peer1.org1.example.com Hyperledger/Fabric-peer Peer2 node
peer0.org2.example.com Hyperledger/Fabric-peer Peer3 node
peer1.org2.example.com Hyperledger/Fabric-peer Peer4 node
ca.example.com Hyperledger/Fabric-ca CA server
Couchdb Hyperledger/Fabric-couchdb Couchdb
Cli Hyperledger/Fabric-tools Client
Table 3: Performance parameters of experimental equipment.
Equipment name Configuration
Local server Ubuntu Linux release 18.04
Virtual machine CentOS Linux release 7.8.2003(Core)
IPFS_1 Windows10; CPU i7-8550U; RAM 16.0GB
IPFS_2 Windows10; CPU r7-4800U; RAM 16.0GB
IPFS_3 Windows10; CPU i5-9300H; RAM 16.0GB
IPFS_4 Windows10; CPU i7-8650U; RAM 16.0GB
IPFS_5 Windows10; CPU i5-6200U; RAM 4.0GB
IPFS_6 Windows10; CPU i5-4210H; RAM 8.0GB
IPFS_7 Windows10; CPU i5-9300H; RAM 8.0GB
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5.3.2. File Storage Mode. (is experiment was a storage
performance comparison between different file storage
modes. (e access control scheme proposed by Wang et al.
[25] uses a cloud server to store files. A local LAN server was
used for cloud server storage, and the cluster devices of other
IPFS distributed networks were also in the same LAN; the
detailed configuration is presented in Table 3. (is experi-
ment was conducted to test the time taken to upload and
download different-sized files under two storage modes. As
shown in Figures 7 and 8, the experimental results indicate
that, under the condition of the same file size, the upload and
download times of the IPFS storage scheme were, respec-
tively, about 8% and 11% those of the cloud storage scheme.
(erefore, the adoption of the proposed IPFS storage scheme
can improve the computational efficiency and reduce the
system overhead.
5.3.3. Overall Encryption Efficiency. In this experiment, we
compare the overall encryption efficiency. (e overall en-
cryption time includes file storage time, time spent writing
data to the blockchain, CP-ABE encryption time, and AES
encryption time. (e number of attributes was unchanged,
and the encryption and decryption time of different schemes
were calculated by changing the size of the files. As shown in
Figure 9, with the increase of the file size, the encryption time
of Wang’s increased rapidly. Both Wang’s and our scheme
use the CP-ABE and AES algorithm to archive access
control, but the two access control processes are different.
(e overall encryption efficiency of Wang’s was lower than
that of our scheme.
5.4. Security Analysis. In our scheme, the owner generates
and distributes the attribute private key for the user. It not
only solves many security risks caused by untrusted attribute
authorities in attribute-based encryption schemes but also
fine-grained access control is implemented for users without
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Figure 9: Overall encryption efficiency.
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Table 4 presents a comparison between the proposed
scheme and methods put forward in other similar studies.
Ge et al. [7] and Li et al. [8] only applied blockchain
technology to their respective schemes, and stored impor-
tant data on the blockchain to ensure data security and
personal privacy. Novo [19], Li et al. [20], Ding et al. [21],
and Jemel and Serhrouchni [18] did not only store important
data on the blockchain but also demonstrated strong access
control ability. Similar to the work reported in the present
article, Jemel introduced CP-ABE encryption technology to
achieve the fine-grained access control of blockchain data,
and the built-in encryption technology ensures the confi-
dentiality and integrity of the data. However, the storage
bottleneck of blockchain systems was not considered, and
the scalability is weak.
Zhang and Wang [12], Dai et al. [22], and Cheng et al.
[23] considered the storage bottleneck of blockchain sys-
tems. Zhang and Dai reduced the storage space of block-
chain data and improved the scalability of the blockchain
system by compressing the data itself. (e method proposed
by Cheng et al. [23] was also demonstrated to achieve high
performance in many aspects. It uses AES to encrypt data
and then stores the hash values on the chain to ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of the data. Moreover, it stores
encrypted data on edge servers with multiple copies, thereby
improving the scalability, reliability, and robustness of the
system. However, in this scheme, data consumers need the
consent of the data owner to access the data, and the fine-
grained access ability is weak. With the increase of the
amount of access, the communication overhead increases
significantly, and the feasibility of practical application is
low. Via comparative analysis, the scheme proposed in the
present study demonstrated advantages in ensuring data
confidentiality, integrity, and scalability.
6. Conclusion
To achieve secure IoT data sharing and fine-grained access
control, this paper proposed a data access control scheme
based on the CP-ABE algorithm and blockchain technology.
In this scheme, the hash value of the data, the location
information of the encrypted data, and the access control
strategy are stored on the blockchain. (e blockchain en-
sures the integrity and tamperability of these data, so as to
achieve fine-grained access to data efficiently. Our scheme
not only ensures that the data cannot be tampered with but
also ensures that the access control strategy cannot be
tampered with.
(e proposed scheme alleviates the storage pressure and
effectively improves the scalability of the blockchain. (e
results of a contrast experiment with the cloud storage
scheme demonstrate that, as compared to the cloud storage
scheme, the proposed scheme consumed 8% of the time to
store files and 11% of the time to access files. In addition, a
fine-grained access control mechanism that combines the
symmetric encryption algorithm and CP-ABE was pro-
posed. In this mechanism, the symmetric encryption algo-
rithm is first used to encrypt the data, and the CP-ABE
algorithm is then used to encrypt the symmetric encryption
key. (is mechanism ensures the security of IoT data, en-
ables data owners to control their data visitors in a fine-
grained way, and ensures that the data cannot be tampered
with.
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